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Abstract 
After explaining the role of Collective Action Clauses (CAC), this paper explores how these have 
been developed in the ‘statutory’ CAC operation in Greece in 2012 and the Euro-area CAC 
provisions found in the ESM Treaty which apply to all Euro-area bonds issued from 2013. The 
paper explains the legal risks that arise and the capacity of CAC to assist in debt restructuring. 
Noting certain remaining weaknesses in the existing Euro CAC, the paper closes by offering some 
modifications as well as more long term solutions to debt restructuring.  
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1 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explain what Collective Action Clauses (CAC) are and 
to provide an appraisal of the rules on CAC that were adopted as a result of the euro area 
crisis. CAC are provisions contained in the terms of bonds issued by states. It was a key legal 
mechanism used in the only sovereign debt restructuring ever carried out in the euro area: the 
2012 Greek debt swap. In addition, the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM Treaty),
1
 the agreement between the euro area states creating a permanent bailout fund, 
provides for the implementation of identical CAC in all sovereign bonds issued by Eurozone 
states after January 2013.
2
 Those CAC must be drafted after a model developed by a Sub-
Committee of the Economic and Financial Committee, in consultation with market 
participants (Euro CAC or Euro area Model).
3
Section 1 highlights CAC’s main function. Section 2 describes how CAC were used in 
the Greek sovereign debt restructuring. Section 3 provides an appraisal of the main features of 
the Euro CAC developed pursuant to the ESM Treaty. Section 4 identifies the circumstances 
under which a sovereign debt restructuring could be envisaged in the future according to the 
1
 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (2 February 2011) <http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015. 
2
 Article 12 (3) of the ESM Treaty (‘Collective action clauses shall be included, as of January 2013, in all euro 
area government securities, with maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that their legal impact is 
identitcal’). 
3
 For the text of the Euro CAC, see EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, ‘Common Terms of 
Reference’ (17 February 2012) <http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf> accessed 
15 February 2015 (hereinafter ‘Euro CAC’). 
 2 
ESM Treaty. Section 5 concludes by identifying the risks under the present scheme and by 
considering reform paths to alleviate them. 
 
 
 
 
1. What are CACs? What is their function? 
 
A euro area state hit by a major debt crisis has essentially two main options: (a) obtain 
financial assistance from the IMF and the ESM and (b) negotiate a debt restructuring with its 
creditors. The purpose of the restructuring is to obtain - from the state’s creditors - a reduction 
of the debt’s principal or interest rate. This process entails a significant reduction of the net 
present value of the debt, so-called ‘NPV reduction’ or ‘haircut’. Alternatively, a debt 
restructuring can signify a pushing-out of the debt maturity, usually called ‘debt reprofiling’. 
In both instances, the transaction can either consist in a direct alteration of the debt’s payment 
terms or a debt swap, i.e. an exchange of the outstanding debt instruments with freshly issued 
debt instruments with different payment terms. 
 
A debt restructuring runs across one major legal difficulty. In principle, changes to 
payment terms require the consent of all contracting parties to the loan agreement (the 
borrower and all the lenders). Since the 1980s, states generally do not finance themselves 
through the conclusion of loan agreements with a few banks – i.e. syndicated loan agreements 
- but through the issuance of bonds. A bond issue is a loan involving potentially thousands of 
lenders: the bondholders, who might be banks, pension funds, investment funds or even retail 
investors. Obtaining the unanimous consent of all of them to a restructuring plan submitted by 
the state is close to impossible. There will always be recalcitrant bondholders who will refuse 
to agree on a ‘haircut’. Some might attempt to negotiate ‘on the side’ with the state to obtain a 
more advantageous deal. Others might decide to initiate court proceedings with a view to 
seizing the state’s assets and recovering the full face value of their bonds. Such holdout 
behaviors can be very disruptive for the restructuring process. As the 2001 Argentinean debt 
crisis illustrates, a disorderly restructuring can plague the economic recovery of a troubled 
State and delay the moment where it can regain market access.  
 
 3 
The solution found to ease sovereign debt restructuring is a set of contractual provisions to 
be included in the bond terms: Collective Action Clauses. CAC’s main provision is a 
supermajority amendment mechanism. Each bondholder, when buying the bonds, consents to 
the fact that, if a qualified majority of them - usually those holding 2/3 or ¾ of the face value 
of the bonds - agree on a restructuring plan submitted by the state, the plan will be binding 
upon everyone, even upon those who voted against. The main virtue of this clause is to 
discourage holdout behavior. The non-participating bondholders are bound by the 
supermajority decision and are, in principle, prevented from litigating in order to obtain full 
repayment of their bonds.  
 
2. ‘Statutory CAC’: The Greek Debt Restructuring of March/April 20114 
 
Similarly to any loan contract, the law of a given state governs the validity and 
performance of a bond issue.
5
 The greater proportion of debt instruments issued by euro area 
states is governed by the domestic law of the issuing state while the remaining part of euro 
area debt stock is subject to a foreign law (mainly English law because they are issued on the 
London bond market). Prior to the Eurozone crisis, CAC had been standard terms in bonds 
governed by English law for a long time. Debt instruments issued under local law, however, 
did not usually include such a set of contractual provisions. 
 
When the Greek debt crisis erupted, 20 millions of bonds issued by Greece under English 
law were equipped with CAC and could be restructured separately according to their terms. 
The remaining 177.3 billions of bonds (86% of the face value of the debt targeted by the 
restructuring) were ‘CAC less’ bonds governed by Greek law. 6   In spite of this, in 
April/March 2012, the Hellenic Republic restructured those bonds successfully. How did 
Greece succeed in implementing the largest sovereign debt restructuring ever carried out in 
financial history? The Greek authorities could take advantage of the fact that Greek law 
governed the bonds. Theoretically, by adopting a law to that effect, the Greek legislature 
could have directly changed the payment terms of those bonds. This confrontational strategy 
would have undermined market confidence even more and could have affected the borrowing 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed analysis of the Greek debt restructuring, see J. Zettelmeyer, C. Trebesch & M. Gulati, ‘The 
Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy’, (2013) 28 Economic Policy 513.  
5
 The bond terms designate the law governing the bonds in the so-called ‘governing law clause’. 
6
 J. Zettelmeyer & al. , (no 5), 515. 
 4 
costs of other troubled euro area states.
7
 Instead, a more consensual approach was followed 
based on a creative legal technique: a ‘statutory CAC’.8 Via the Bondholders Act 4050/12 
adopted in February 2012, Greece incorporated retroactively a CAC with a voting threshold 
of 2/3 in its domestic law bonds.
9
 The restructuring took the form of a bonds swap. The Greek 
bonds were exchanged mainly against debt instruments with a reduced NPV governed by 
English law.
10
 Around 85 % of the creditors holding bonds governed by domestic law 
eventually adhered to the exchange offer and Greece activated the statutory CAC.
11
  
 
This strategy of retrofitting CAC in bonds governed by domestic law gave rise to 
litigation. A Slovakian bank challenged the lawfulness of the restructuring process before an 
arbitral tribunal on the basis of a bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’) concluded by Greece with 
Slovakia.
12
 In addition, other unsatisfied bondholders brought proceedings before the Greek 
Council of State based on the Greek Constitution and the European Convention of Human 
Rights, which protect the right to property.
13
 In both instances the purpose of the claimants 
was to show that, by activating a retroactive statutory CAC, Greece expropriated them 
unlawfully from parts of their investment and frustrated their legitimate expectations. The 
outcomes of the bondholders’ claims were to a certain extent uncertain. Judging the 
lawfulness of the legislation adopted by Greece requires appraising the foreseeability and 
proportionality of that measure. For doing so, many variables are to be taken into account: the 
economic context surrounding the restructuring, the negotiations preceding it, the purpose 
pursued by the State and the amount of the ‘haircut’ imposed upon recalcitrant bondholders. 
                                                 
7 L.C. Buccheit & M. Gulati, see ‘Restructuring a nation’s debt’, (2010-2011) 29 International Financial Law 
Review 46. 
8
 The idea of a ‘statutory CAC’ was developed by L.C. Buccheit & M. Gulati, see (no 8), 46. 
9
 An unofficial English translation of the Greek Bondholders Act 4050/12 is available at the following address: 
<http://andreaskoutras.blogspot.be/2012/03/better-tarnslation-of-bondholders-act.html> accessed 15 February 
2015. 
10
 Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Finance, Press Release (28 February 2012) <http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/files/2012/03/Greek.Min-Fin-Press_Release_Feb.24-2012.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015. 
11
 Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Finance, Press Release (9 March 2012) 
<http://www.pdma.gr/attachments/article/80/9%20MARCH%202012%20-%20RESULTS.pdf >accessed 15 
February 2015. 
12
 This BIT is part of a network of thousands of such agreements concluded bilaterally by EU Member States 
among them and with third countries. By virtue of a BIT, two States grant a set of guarantees to each other’s 
nationals who are investing on their territory. Typically, those guarantees include a protection against unfair and 
inequitable treatment by the State authorities and a protection against unlawful deprivation of their investments. 
For the case, see Postova Banka SA and Istrokapital SE v Helenic Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/13/8 
<http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4238.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015. 
13
 Note that houldout investors have also initiated litigation before multiple German courts. The German Federal 
Court (Bundesgerichtshof) is expected to rule on the admissibility of such claims in the course of 2016. See 
Bundesgerichtshof, Mitteilung der Presestelle Nr. 159/2015, Terminhinweis in Sachen VI ZR 516/14 für den 8. 
März 2016 (Umschuldung griechischer Staatsanleihen). 
 5 
There might also have been good reasons to differentiate the situation of each claimant 
depending on his degree of sophistication and the timing of the bonds’ purchase. An 
institutional investor who bought below investment grade bonds on the secondary market 
should have foreseen the possibility of incurring substantial losses as a result of a 
restructuring. One could say that he should also have known that bonds governed by foreign 
law are safer investments than bonds governed by local law. On the contrary, a retroactive 
CAC is a legal coup that retail investors with little knowledge of the market and its practices 
could not have predicted.
14
 
 
Eventually, both the arbitral tribunal and the Greek Council of State dismissed the 
proceedings, but on different grounds. The arbitral tribunal held that sovereign bonds did not 
qualify as a ‘protected investment’ under the definition given to this term by the Slovakia-
Greece BIT.
15
 This controversial issue turned mainly on how to interpret the wording of the 
definition of ‘investment’ provided by the Slovakia-Greece BIT. In cases involving the 2005 
Argentinean debt restructuring, other arbitral tribunals reached an opposite outcome on 
similar issues on the basis of the Argentina-Italy BIT whose wording differed.
16
 The Greek 
Council of State, for its part, ruled that the provisions of the Greek constitution enshrining the 
right to property were not transgressed. In its view, the constitutional protection against 
expropriation is limited to rights in rem without extending to contractual claims.
17
 Nor did the 
Greek legislation infringe upon the investors’ property rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Considering the compelling interest pursued, safeguarding the 
Greek economy, the financial losses imposed upon private bondholders were proportionate. 
                                                 
14
 For an assessment of the compatibility of the Greek debt restructuring with the European Convention on 
Human Rights, see P. Wautelet, ‘The Greek Debt Restructuring and Property Rights. A Greek Tragedy for 
Investors?’, in A. Allen et al. (eds) Liberae Cogitationes ogitatioamicorum Marc Bossuyt (2013). See also M. 
Boudreau, ‘Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are Retrofit Collective Action Clauses 
Expropriatory?’(Harvard Business Law Review Online, 2012) <http://www.hblr.org/?p=2283> accessed 15 
February 2015 (examining whether American courts would find the Greek Bondholders Act to be an invalid 
expropriation under international law).  
15
 See Postova Banka,  at para. 248-324. For a case note analyzing the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal on this 
point, see F. Montanaro, ‘Postova Banka SA and Istrokapital SE v Helenic Republic: Sovereign Bonds and the 
Puzzling Definition of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Law’, (2015) 30 ICSID Review 549. 
16
 See Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N° ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (4 August 2011) <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf> accessed 
15 February 2015; Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N ｰ ARB/08/9, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (8 February 2013) <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1276.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015.  
17
 Decision of the Greek Council of State, 23 March 2014 (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias, case 1116-1117/2014) (no 
English translation availabe). For a casenote in English on the case, see ‘Exchange of Bonds Issued or 
Guaranteed by the Greek State’ (Norton Rose Fulbright, April 2014) 
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/exchange-of-bonds-issued-or-guaranteed-by-the-greek-state-
115005.PDF> accessed 15 February 2015. 
 6 
 
3. The Euro CAC: ‘contractual’ CAC 
 
The ESM Treaty mandates the implementation of identical CAC in all sovereign bonds 
issued by Eurozone states after January 2013. In the midst of the crisis, adding a provision to 
the ESM Treaty mandating the inclusion of CAC conveyed an important political message 
directly addressed to the citizens. The ESM Treaty establishes a permanent bailout fund 
financed by euro area Member States’ tax revenues. However, through a sovereign debt 
restructuring, private creditors will also share a part of the financial burden required to restore 
stability in the euro area.
18
  
 
Leaving aside the political function of CAC, what is the advantage of having identical 
CAC in all bonds issued by euro area states? What are the main features of the Euro CAC? 
The Euro CAC has brought three major legal changes, which are examined and assessed 
below. 
 
1. Identical CAC  
 
 The debt of euro area states is composed of a myriad of bond issues with varying terms 
and possibly governed by different laws. Without identical CAC, the restructuring process 
could potentially vary from bond issue to bond issue. Bondholders could be treated differently 
depending on the terms of their bonds and the applicable law. The Euro CAC harmonizes the 
restructuring process to a certain extent and makes it more predictable. The voting threshold 
set will be identical and the mechanics of the restructuring process similar.  
 
However, the underlying law applicable to the CAC and the other terms of the bonds 
remain different from euro area state to euro area state, and even from bond issue to bond 
issue. Further harmonization would have required subjecting all bond issues in the euro area 
to the law of a single commonly agreed EU Member State. Alternatively, via a mechanism of 
dépeçage, the CAC could have been separated from the other terms of the bonds. The law of a 
single State would govern the CAC while the issuing State could still subject the other terms 
of the bond to another law. Both options would have entailed a curtailment of euro area 
                                                 
18
 A. Gelpern & M. Gulati, ‘Sovereign Snake Oli’, (2011) Washington College of Law Research Paper n° 2011-
05 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732650> accessed 15 February 2015. 
 7 
states’ sovereignty that was considered politically unacceptable.19 Another possibility would 
have been to adopt the Euro CAC as a EU legal act but no clear basis in the founding Treaties 
entrusts the EU with the competence to regulate such a subject matter.
20
 
 
2. ‘An aggregate CAC with a single limb voting procedure’ 
 
Originally, standard New York and English CAC were ‘individual CAC’ in that they 
covered solely individual bond issue. Each bond issue is restructured separately and the 
voting threshold is calculated for each bond issue. Holdout bondholders could therefore 
acquire a blocking minority in one bond issue to prevent the activation of the CAC. This 
weakness in the design of ‘individual’ CAC can be exploited by creditors and especially by 
the most ill intentioned of them, the infamous ‘vulture funds’. The business strategy of those 
hedge funds consists in buying distressed sovereign bonds at a discount on the secondary 
market and then attempt to recover their full face value, through litigation or ‘side 
agreements’ negotiated with the state. 
 
In contrast, ‘aggregate CAC’ make inter-bond issues' modifications possible. An 
‘aggregate CAC with a single limb voting procedure’ allows a restructuring of the debt across 
bond series subject to a single supermajority requirement. The voting threshold required for 
the activation of the CAC is to be calculated at an aggregate level, for all bond issues covered 
by the restructuring plan. It is therefore much more difficult - if not completely impossible - 
for holdout creditors to resist the restructuring by acquiring a blocking minority.  
 
The Greek debt restructuring illustrates the advantages of ‘aggregate CAC with a 
single limb voting procedure’ over ‘individual CAC’. The CAC incorporated by the Hellenic 
Republic in the bonds governed by Greek law was inter-series. The activation of the CAC 
bound all bondholders across series. No bonds were left ‘non-restructured’. In contrast, the 
bonds issued by Greece under English law included only ‘individual CAC’. Holdout creditors 
stalled the restructuring of 16 bonds series by expressly rejecting the exchange offer made by 
Greece.
21
 Fearing holdout litigation, Greece repaid fully the principal of non-restructured 
                                                 
19
 See A. Sainz de Vicunia y Barroso, ‘Identical Collective Action Clauses for Different Legal Systems: a 
European Model’, in P. Kenadijan & K.-A. Bauer (eds), Collective Action Clauses and the Restructuring of 
Sovereign Debt (2013) 15, 21 
20
 Ibid. 
21
J. Zettelmeyer et al., (n 5) 527. 
 8 
bonds maturing a month after the completion of the transaction.
 22
 The payment amounted to 
436 million euros, 90% of which went to a well-known vulture fund based in Cayman Islands, 
Dart Management. This fund made important profit on this operation since it had previously 
acquired those bonds on the secondary market at between 60 to 70% of their face value.
23
 
 
Compared to ‘individual CAC’ prevailing on the New York and London bond 
markets, the Euro CAC was a novelty at the time of its adoption in 2011. It introduces an 
aggregate CAC with ‘a two limb voting procedure’. The payment terms can be modified 
across bond series if two voting thresholds are met, one calculated in the aggregate and the 
other one for each bond issuance. If the restructuring proposal is submitted to creditors at a 
bondholders’ meeting, the CAC is activated by a positive vote of 75% of the amount of all 
affected bonds in the aggregate represented at the meeting and 66 2/3% of the amount of each 
individual bond series represented at the meeting.
 24
 The Euro CAC facilitates inter-series 
modifications but falls short of eliminating the risk of holdout behavior altogether. In a future 
euro area restructuring, minorities could still obstruct the restructuring of single bond issues. 
Following the example of Dart Management, vulture funds and other ill-intentioned creditors 
could strategically acquire, at a discount, a blocking position of 33 1/3% in a bond issue. By 
exerting pressure to obtain full payment, they could then attempt to make juicy profits at the 
expense of the distressed state and its cooperative creditors. 
 
In order to address this problem, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) 
has, since then, proposed a refined majority amendment clause: an aggregate CAC with ‘a 
single limb voting procedure’.25 Back in 2011, the EU Sub-Committee in charge with drafting 
                                                 
22
Ibid. 
23
 T. Wortswall, ‘The Value of Foreign Law Investing: Greece Pays out on English Bonds’, (Forbes, 16 May 
2012) < http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/05/16/the-value-of-foreign-law-in-investing-greece-pays-
out-on-english-bonds/> accessed 15 February 2015> accessed 15 February 2015; T. Landon, ‘Bet on Greek 
Bonds Paid Off for ‘Vulture Fund’, (New York Times, 15 May 2012) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/business/global/bet-on-greek-bonds-paid-off-for-vulture-
fund.html?_r=0>accessed 15 February 2015. 
24
 Section 2.2 of the Euro CAC.  
25
 See International Market Association Standard, ‘Aggregated Collective Action Clauses (‘CAC’) for the Terms 
and Conditions of Sovereign Notes’ (August 2014) <http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-
Practice/Primary-Markets/collective-action/> accessed 15 February 2015.  For comments on the innovative 
features of the new ICMA model, see A. Gelpern, ‘A Sensible Step to Mitigate Sovereign Bond Mysfunction’ 
(Peterson Institute For International Economics, 29 August 2014) 
<http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4485#.VBlnUiofqW8.email> accessed 15 February 2015. 
 9 
the Euro CAC rejected the idea of a truly ‘aggregate’ CAC. 26  It raised doubts as to its 
enforceability in all euro area jurisdictions as well as to its fairness. Given the absence of a 
supervising judicial authority, the sovereign and its largest creditors could abuse the 
restructuring process. The ICMA Model addresses the latter concern by providing an 
additional safeguard. The activation of the CAC with a single limb voting procedure is subject 
to the condition that all creditors be treated equally. The terms of the restructuring plan should 
be identical for all affected bondholders. Investors holding majorities in largest bond issues 
cannot coalesce with the sovereign to adopt a restructuring plan that would discriminate 
against majoritarian bondholders in smaller bond issues. 
 
This innovation proposed by ICMA has been endorsed by the IMF
27
 and is 
increasingly implemented, sometimes with small variations, in bond terms issued on the New 
York and London markets.
28
 If those nascent contractual practices were to evolve into 
boilerplate bond terms, the Euro CAC, a novelty at the time of its adoption, could lie 
somewhat behind global developments on the major financial markets.  
 
3. ‘Contractual’ CAC 
 
The Greek debt restructuring gave rise to litigation mainly because it relied upon a 
‘statutory CAC’. In a restructuring process carried out in accordance with a ‘contractual 
CAC’, each bondholder has agreed upon the CAC when buying the bonds and has 
acknowledged that he might be bound by a supermajority decision to alter the bonds’ terms. 
No claim of expropriation or of unfair and inequitable treatment could be put forward. 
Litigation could occur only in more marginal instances. This would be the case, for example, 
if the state manipulates the votes at the bondholders’ meeting,29 or coerces creditors into a 
                                                 
26
 EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, ‘Collective Action Clause – Explanatory Note’ (26 July 
2011) <http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/explanatory_note_draft_on_the_model_cac_-_26_july.pdf > 
accessed 15 February 2015. 
27
 See IMF, ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems’ (October 2014) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015.  
28
 See IMF, ‘Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bon 
Contracts’ (15 September 2015) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/091715.pdf> accessed 15 
February 2015.  
29
 M. Waibel, ‘Opening the Pandora Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration’, (2007) 101 American 
Journal of International Law 711,724. 
 10 
restructuring offer.
30
 As regards bonds governed by domestic law, litigation is also likely to 
occur if the state, via a retroactive law, lowers the voting threshold defined in a ‘contractual’ 
CAC or turns a ‘contractual CAC with a double limb voting procedure’ into one with a single 
one. Modifying ex post the ‘contractual’ CAC would however not violate as such the ESM 
Treaty. The latter only mandates the inclusion of Euro CAC in bond terms but does not 
require that every euro area restructuring be implemented according to its provisions.  
 
Does it mean that litigation risks associated with the adoption of a statutory CAC have 
been eliminated? Has the Euro CAC rendered the Greek scenario obsolete? The Greek 
scenario is certainly obsolete for the Hellenic Republic itself. Through its 2012 debt swap, 
Greece has replaced its bonds in circulation with debt instruments governed by English law 
and equipped with Euro CAC. If Greece were to implement a new restructuring, it would only 
be playing by the contractual rules set out ex ante in the CAC. As the bonds exchanged 
include CAC drafted after the Euro area Model, the risk of blocking minorities in single bond 
issue remains. If Greece were to restructure its privately held debt a second time, it could still 
be exposed to vulture funds strategies akin to the ones adopted by Dart Management. The 
payment made to Dart Management in the aftermath of the debt exchange could inspire 
investors to follow that example.
 31
 
 
For other euro area states, depending on the composition of their debt stock and its 
governing law, a statutory CAC might well prove to be a useful -if not necessary- tool to 
implement a sovereign debt restructuring. The ESM Treaty mandates the inclusion of the 
Euro CAC in bonds issued after 1 January 2013 without affecting debt instruments issued 
prior to that date. It will still take some time before the outstanding debt stock is replaced by 
one equipped with majority amendment provisions. This is especially so because the 
implementation of contractual CAC in euro area bonds terms will be progressive. In order to 
preserve market liquidity, a euro area state is allowed to issue bonds without CAC as part of a 
reopening of an outstanding debt issuance (called ‘tapping’) up to a defined percentage of the 
overall face amount of the bonds issued by that euro area state in that year.
32
 This percentage 
                                                 
30
 K. Gallagher, ‘The New Vulture Culture, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Trade and Investment 
Treaties’,The Ideas Working Paper Series n° 02/2011 
<http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/GallagherSovereignDebt.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015. 
31 J. Zettelmeyer et al., (n 8) 552 (noting that the repayment of recalcitrant creditors in the aftermath of the 
Greek debt swap is likely to encourage holdouts in any future euro area restructuring).  
32
 See the conclusions of the European Council EUCO/10/1/11 (24/25 March 2011). 
 11 
was set at 45% for 2013 and is decreasing periodically to reach 5% in 2023.
33
 Because ‘CAC 
less’ bonds will remain in circulation in the coming years,34 it is not excluded that a euro area 
state might well be left with no other choice than to restructure bonds which do not yet 
include a CAC. The adoption of a statutory CAC similar to the Greek Bondholders Act could 
be contemplated to restructure those bonds, provided that it is possible under the constitution 
of the euro area state concerned.
35
 A hypothetical debt swap implemented in the near future 
would most likely have to rely upon two mechanisms:  
(1) A statutory CAC for all bonds governed by domestic law, which do not yet include 
CAC, and 
(2) A contractual CAC for the remaining of the debt stock. In the latter case, the CAC 
might either be drafted after the Euro area Model or ‘individual’ CAC, as they existed 
prior to the adoption of the Euro area Model.  
Similarly to Greece, the adoption of a statutory CAC would expose the troubled state to legal 
challenges before domestic courts and arbitration tribunals.   
 
4. The current framework for potential future Eurozone debt restructuring? 
 
The political signals sent during the crisis as to when a sovereign debt restructuring would 
be considered have been mixed. On the one hand, the euro area Heads of state and 
government have insisted multiple times that the Greek scenario was ‘exceptional and 
unique’. They have reiterated solemnly their commitments to comply with the payment terms 
originally agreed with their creditors.
36
  On the other hand, mandating CAC in bond terms 
constitutes in itself an acknowledgement that a restructuring in the Eurozone is not 
impossible. This unclear political attitude towards restructuring can be explained by the 
somewhat contradictory needs to reassure both the market (that a restructuring is unlikely) 
                                                 
33
 EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, Supplemental Explanatory Note on the Model 
Collective Action Clause’ (26 March 2012) 
<http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_cac_-
_26_march_2012.pdf >accessed 15 February 2015. 
34
 It is difficult to predict the precise amount of time that it will take before the entire Euro area debt stock be 
equipped with CAC. Two factors are to be taken into account: the maturity of the outstanding debt issued prior 
to 1 January 2013 and the extent to which Euro area states have made use of the possibility to ‘tap’ bond series 
issued prior to that date.  
35 Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., (no 8)  553 (noting that, in Cyprus, the adoption of a retroactive CAC would not 
be constitutionally permissible). 
36
 See Euro Summit statement (28 October 2011); Statement by the Heads of State or Gouvernement of the Euro 
area and EU Institutions (21 July 2011); Agreed lines of communication  by euro area Member States (30 
January 2012). See also Council Reply to the Question for Written Answer E-000636/12, 2 April 2012, (2013) 
OJ C 81 E/134. 
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and the taxpayers (that bailing-out distressed States with their tax money would not be the 
only response to the sovereign debt crisis). 
In this regard, the Preamble to the ESM Treaty contains a few political indications as to 
the scope and content of a possible future restructuring in the euro area as well as to the 
circumstances under which it should be envisaged. The relevant recital of the ESM Treaty is 
worded as follows: 
 
‘(12) In accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases, an adequate and 
proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be considered in cases 
where stability support is provided accompanied by conditionality in the form 
of a macro-economic adjustment programme’ 
 
It is worth analyzing this recital closely. 
 
 ‘In exceptional cases’ 
 
The ESM Treaty envisages sovereign debt restructuring only in relation to the system of 
financial assistance it establishes, and considers it as a last resort mechanism to be used ‘in 
exceptional circumstances’. 37  What do such ‘exceptional circumstances’ entail? While 
financial assistance by the ESM purports to address temporary liquidity crises, a restructuring 
is to be envisaged in the more severe situations of sovereign insolvency, when the debt of a 
State has reached an unsustainable level. Upon the receipt by the ESM of a request for 
financial assistance, the European Commission, jointly with the IMF and in liaison with the 
ECB, undertakes a debt sustainability analysis of the troubled state.
38
 This analysis is the basis 
for distinguishing between liquidity and solvency crises. The ESM Board of Governors (and 
the euro area states behind the ESM) can then decide, with a wide margin of discretion, 
whether a ‘haircut’ should be a condition for obtaining financial assistance from the ESM. A 
restructuring can also be contemplated for a state already under financial assistance if its debt 
is later found to be unsustainable. In that case, the restructuring can be a prerequisite for 
obtaining further financial assistance.  
 
                                                 
37
 See Recital 12 of the ESM Treaty. 
38
 Article 13 (1) (a) of the ESM Treaty. See also Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 472 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability, (2013) OJ L 140/1. 
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As in the Greek scenario,
39
 if it proves possible, the sovereign will then subsequently 
negotiate the details of the terms of the restructuring offer with a committee representing its 
most important private creditors. A ‘take it or leave it’ offer made by the States without prior 
consultation with private creditors might face opposition and encourage holdout.
40
 
 
 ‘An adequate and proportionate restructuring’ 
 
The restructuring should be ‘adequate and proportionate’. This requirement relates to the 
content of the restructuring deal. The proportionality requirement is to be interpreted as 
meaning (1) that the transaction should not unduly weaken the European banking and 
financial sector by asking banks and financial institutions holding sovereign debt to accept a 
loss they would be unable to absorb, (2) that the debt of the state facing payment difficulties 
should not be reduced beyond what is necessary to restore financial stability in the euro area. 
The restructuring also has to be adequate. This means that the debt relief obtained by the State 
should be sufficient to reduce its level of indebtedness to a manageable level, so that no 
subsequent restructuring is necessary. In this respect, CAC appears as a procedural guarantee 
ensuring the respect of those political requirements. Subjecting a restructuring to the approval 
of a majority of bondholders ensures that a certain balance between the concerns of both the 
debtor and its creditors is reached. It falls upon the shoulders of the troubled state to convince 
a supermajority of its bondholders of the necessity and fairness of the restructuring plan. A 
disproportionate deal would be rejected.  That the transaction be proportionate and adequate is 
a political guidance not devoid of legal effect. A disproportionate restructuring is exposed to 
the risk of being successfully challenged ex post. In a legal challenge against a statutory CAC, 
proportionality will serve as a yardstick against which the lawfulness of the restructuring will 
be assessed.  
 
 A ‘Private Sector Involvement’ transaction 
 
                                                 
39
 J. Zettlemeyer et al., (no 8) 533. 
40
 On the advantages and drawbacks of creditor committees, see T. DeSieno, ‘Creditor Committees in Sovereign 
Debt Restructurings: Understanding the Benefits and Addressing Concerns’ (December 2014) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd////wp-content/uploads/2014/12/9Dec14-BS-statement.pdf>accessed 15 February 
2015. 
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Sovereign debt restructuring is conceived mainly as a ‘Private Sector Involvement’ 
transaction (‘PSI’).41 Its purpose is to ask the private sector to contribute to the restoration of 
the financial stability of a heavily indebted state. A restructuring plan would therefore 
primarily target bonds held by private bondholders. Otherwise, the ESM Treaty provides no 
other guidance as to the scope of the PSI. As long as it succeeds in obtaining a sufficient debt 
relief and in complying with the possible instructions given by the official sector, the state 
enjoys certain flexibility with regard to designing the scope and defining the terms of the 
structuring proposal.  
 
Besides private investors, the IMF, the ESM as well as the Eurosystem (the ECB and 
national central banks of euro area) would also be major creditors. The IMF and the ESM 
could have already granted loans assistance to the troubled state. For its part, the Eurosystem 
has engaged in sovereign bonds buying on the secondary market within the framework of its 
monetary policy. Between 2010 and 2012, under the Securities Market Program (SMP), the 
Eurosystem purchased debt instruments issued by Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, 
which it will hold until maturity.
42
 This programme was terminated in 2012 with the 
announcement of the Outright Monetary Transaction programme (OMT). The latter scheme, 
which has never been activated to date, would allow the Eurosystem to acquire potentially 
unlimited amounts of bonds issued by states benefiting from an ESM programme, as long as 
the conditionality attached to such a programme is complied with. In addition, in March 2015, 
the Governing Council of the ECB has launched a quantitative easing operation dubbed 
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), which cover primarily euro area governments 
bonds.
 43
  The PSPP and the SMP programmes have made of the Eurosystem a very large 
holder of euro area public debt.  
 
In a hypothetical PSI, what would then be the fate of this sizable debt in the hands of the 
official sector (IMF, ESM and the Eurosystem)? The Preamble to the ESM Treaty recognizes 
that the ESM and the IMF are ‘preferred creditors’, which justify that their claims be 
exempted from a PSI transaction altogether.
44
 Their privileged status is designed to protect 
                                                 
41
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
42
 ECB Decision establishing a securities markets programme (ECB/2010/5), (2010) OJ L 124/8. 
43
 ECB Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme 
(ECB/2015/10), (2015) OJ L 212/20 (PSPP Decision) 
44
 See Recitals 13-14 of the ESM Treaty.   
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taxpayers’ money45  and derives more generally from the role of those institutions: they 
provide financial assistance in circumstances where private creditors refuse to do so or only at 
a prohibitive price.
46
  
 
In contrast with the IMF and the ESM, neither EU law nor the Preamble to the ESM 
Treaty confer the status of ‘preferred creditor’ upon the Eurosystem. As a matter of law, the 
ECB and national central banks rank pari passu with private creditors. However, in the 2012 
Greek restructuring, the debt securities bought by the Eurosystem under the SMP programme 
enjoyed de facto a seniority status.
47
 Shortly before the restructuring took place, those bonds 
were exchanged against freshly issued bonds with identical terms, which were exempted from 
the debt swap.
48
 In a case brought by Italian investors affected by the Greek restructuring, the 
General Court ruled that the preferential treatment afforded to the ECB as compared to private 
creditors does not breach the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 20-21 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
49
 This is so because the ECB and private creditors are 
differently situated. A private creditor invests in sovereign bonds for its own benefit while the 
ECB does it as part of its monetary policy.
50
 Considering the legality of this tactic, would the 
ECB replicate it in a hypothetical future restructuring? A definitive decision on this point 
would be made in the phase preceding the restructuring. The answer might depend on the 
bond-buying programme. The status of SMP bonds is unclear but the Greek precedent and 
EBC’s announcements suggest that they could be exempted from the restructuring. 51  In 
contrast, the ECB has declared that it would not claim seniority status in relation to debt 
securities bought under the PSPP
52
 and the OMT (should the latter ever be activated).
53
 If the 
bonds on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet are not exempted from the debt restructuring offer, 
                                                 
45
 See Statement by the Eurogroup (28 November 2010) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf> accessed 15 February 
2016. 
46
 See conclusion of the European Council (EUCO 10/1/11) (4 April 2011). 
47
 For an analysis of the considerations that led the ECB to decline participation in the Greek PSI transaction, see 
A. Sainz de Vicuna, ‘Restructuring in a Monetary Union’, in R.M. Lastra & L. Buchheit, Sovereign Debt 
Management (OUP 2014) 177,184-187. 
48
 J. Black, ‘ECB Said to Swap Greek Bonds for New Debt to Avoid Losses’, (Bloomberg, 17 February 2012)< 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/ecb-said-to-swap-greek-bonds-for-new-debt-to-avoid-
loss-from-restructuring>accessed 15 February 2016; J. Zettelmeyer et al, (n 8), 524. 
49
 T-79/13 Alessandro Accorinti v. BCE (7 October 2015) not yet reported (ECLI:EU:T:2015:756). 
50
 Ibid., paras. 87-91. 
51
 See M. Draghi, ‘Introductory Statement to the Press Conference (with Q&A)’ (6 September 2012) 
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html> accessed 15 February 2016 (‘With 
regard to seniority, the statement on outright monetary purchases does not apply to SMP holdings’). 
52
 Recital 8 of the PSPP Decision. 
53
 See ECB, ‘Press Release - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions’ (6 September 2012) 
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html>accessed 15 February 2016. 
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the Eurosystem is likely to find itself in a cornelian dilemma: should it exercise the voting 
rights attached to those bonds to approve or to oppose the PSI proposal?  
 
Voting in favor could be found incompatible with the Eurosystem mandate under the 
founding Treaties. Article 123 (1) TFEU prohibits the ECB and national central banks from 
printing money to fund euro area states’ treasury. A voluntary participation in the PSI is 
tantamount to accepting a loss to the benefit of the troubled state. This could be read as an 
indirect form of financial assistance that would run afoul of the prohibition of monetary 
financing.
54
  
 
In order to avoid this legal controversy, the ECB intends to systematically oppose any 
proposed restructuring.
55
 A negative vote by the Eurosystem could put the success of the 
whole transaction at risk, as the troubled state might not be able to gather sufficient support 
from the other bondholders. Aware of this danger, the ECB Governing Council has capped 
PSPP purchases to prevent the Eurosystem from acquiring blocking minorities capable of 
thwarting a restructuring based on CAC.
56
 The limit set is twofold and reflects CAC’s voting 
thresholds. Quantitative easing purchases cannot lead the overall Eurosystem’s holding of 
sovereign debt across all its portfolios to exceed 33% per bond issuance (issue share limit) 
and 33% at an aggregate level, for all outstanding bonds issued by each euro area state (issuer 
share limit).
57
 This measure constraints the duration and scale of PSPP purchases
58
 without 
alleviating all risks of imperiling the success of a PSI. If the ECB exercises its voting rights 
attached to PSPP bonds to oppose a restructuring, the sovereign would still have to convince a 
greater proportion of its private bondholders to activate the CAC and bind recalcitrant 
minorities. Moreover, the twofold cap applies only to PSPP purchases. There are no ex ante 
                                                 
54
 C. Hofmann, ‘Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the New Model Collective Action Clauses’, 49 Texas 
Journal of International Law (2014) 383, 417 
55 In the context of the litigation over the compatibility of the OMT program with EU primary law, the ECB has 
stated that it would systematically vote against a proposed restructuring. See Bundesverfasungericht, Order of 14 
January 2014 - 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 8; Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler et al. v Deutsher Bundestag (14 January 
2014) not yet reported (ECLI EU:C:2015:7), Opinion of the AG Bot, para. 235. 
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 Thanks to Thomas Beukers for pointing this out to me. 
57
 See Article 5, PSPP Decision. Note that the voting thresholds of CAC included in bond series issued prior to 1 
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a case-by-case basis that holding 33% would not lead the Eurosystem to have a blocking minority. See ECB 
Decision (EU) 2015/2101 amending Decision (EU) 2015/774 on a secondary markets public sector purchase 
programme, (2015) OJ L 3030/106. 
58
 G. Clays, A. Leandro & A. Mandra, ‘European Central Bank Quantitative Easing: The Detailed Manual’, 
Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/02 (March 2015) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/accounts/2015/html/mg150219.en.pdf >accessed 15 Feburary 2016. 
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quantitative limits on bond-buying under the OMT. In crisis situations, the activation of the 
OMT on top of the PSPP could potentially lead the Eurosystem to have blocking minorities, 
which would in turn further complicate, or even preclude, a sovereign debt restructuring 
based on CAC.  
 
 
5. Conclusion and the way forward 
 
The progressive inclusion of Euro CAC in all bonds issued in the euro area is a 
significant step in the improvement of the restructuring procedure. It makes it more 
predictable and further limits litigation risks. This does not mean that a restructuring would be 
free of major legal challenges.   
 
It will still take some time before all the outstanding euro area debt stock be equipped 
with the Euro CAC. Pending full implementation of this harmonized set of contractual 
provisions, a large-scale restructuring covering the entire privately held debt stock of a euro 
area state would have to rely on two mechanisms: (1) a statutory CAC to restructure the ‘CAC 
less’ bonds governed by domestic law (if the constitution of the state so permits) and, (2) the 
contractual CAC already included in the bond terms for the remaining of the debt stock. Each 
of those parallel transactions would raise a different set of issues:  
 
(1) Statutory CAC: the activation of the statutory CAC would expose the state to litigation 
risks akin to the ones faced by Greece in the aftermath of its 2012 debt swap. A few creditors 
could challenge the lawfulness of the process either before an arbitral tribunal under a BIT or 
before domestic courts. The outcome of such litigation would depend on the context 
surrounding the restructuring, the situation of the litigants and the interpretation of the 
applicable law.  
 
(2) Contractual CAC: as it currently stands, the Euro CAC subjects a modification of bond 
terms to the approval a double majority, one calculated within each bond series and one 
calculated across bond series. Holdout creditors (and vulture funds especially) could acquire 
blocking minorities within bond issuances to obstruct their restructuring. How can the 
distressed state handle the ‘unstructured’ bonds? The magnitude of the problem and the ways 
to address it vary depending on the governing law: 
 18 
 Bonds governed by foreign law: if the recalcitrant creditors hold bonds governed by 
foreign law, the distressed State would have to repay them in full or negotiate another 
arrangement to repay them partly. Alternatively, the State could repudiate them and 
assume the risk that those creditors initiate litigation in multiple jurisdictions to obtain 
full repayment. 
 Bonds governed by domestic law: as regards domestic law bonds, it is believed that the 
risk of holdout behaviors would not be as acute. This is so because the state has an 
additional tool at its disposal to handle those recalcitrant creditors. A law could be 
enacted to change directly the payment terms of their bonds without their consent. 
While this law could be challenged under domestic and international law, the mere 
possibility that the terms of those bonds could be modified unilaterally by the troubled 
state should ex ante incentivize creditors to participate in the debt exchange. 
Theoretically, the distressed state could also prevent bonds from being left 
‘unrestructured’. For doing so, the state would adopt a legislation altering the 
provisions of the Euro CAC. This change could, for example, provide that decisions 
taken by the majority of all bondholders across bond series bind the recalcitrant 
minorities within each single bond issuance. Such a move has very clear drawbacks: it 
would annihilate one of the major gain of the changes brought about by Euro CAC - a 
greater degree of predictability - and could be potentially the source of multiple 
lawsuits in domestic courts and international tribunals.  
 
What to do with the debt instruments held by the Eurosystem would also prove delicate. If 
those bonds were included in the restructuring, the Eurosystem could be caught between the 
devil and the deep blue sea when deciding on how to exercising its voting right. Approving 
the restructuring offer could be found incompatible with its mandate under the founding 
Treaties, while rejecting it could imperil the success of the PSI transaction. 
 
Since the 2012 Greek debt swap, how has the issue of sovereign debt restructuring been 
handled by EU Institutions?  
 
In the on-going development of a European-wide investment law policy, the risk that 
holdouts initiate disruptive litigation before arbitral tribunals has been taken into account. The 
chapters on ‘investment protection’ in the recent trade deals concluded - or to be concluded - 
by the EU with third countries includes an annex restricting the possibility of legal challenges 
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against ‘negotiated’ restructurings based on contractual or statutory CAC. 59  While this 
measure ensures that EU investment agreements will not furnish new basis for legal 
challenges, it does not reduce existing litigation risks. For the time being, holdouts could still 
base their expropriation claims on the myriad investment agreements concluded by EU 
Member States, among them or with third countries. 
 
This noticeable exception apart, while the issue of PSI has been discussed by academics, it 
has disappeared from the official European policy agenda on EMU reforms. The Five 
Presidents’ Report,60 which sets a plan for further EMU reforms, does not mention it. In light 
of the difficulties that the implementation of a PSI transaction could still raise, serious 
considerations should be given to the available avenues to develop a more robust regime for 
sovereign debt workout in the euro area. Two types of reforms should be envisaged: (1) 
refining the Euro CAC in the short term (2) developing a statutory framework for sovereign 
insolvency in the medium term or long term. The precise timing and design of either reform 
would have to be carefully assessed in light of their potential impact on states’ borrowing 
costs.  
 
1. Refining the Euro CAC 
 
Unlike the ICMA model, the Euro CAC still allows holdouts to prevent the activation of 
CAC with respect to single bond issues. The growing implementation of the ICMA model in 
international bond contracts will in the long run create a discrepancy between the Euro CAC 
and the prevailing practices on the major financial markets. To avoid any such issue, the Euro 
CAC could be adapted to the refinements of the contractual provisions proposed by ICMA. 
An enhanced CAC for the euro area could be activated by one single super-majority of 
bondholders calculated at an aggregate level. The EFC Sub-Committee would redraft the 
clauses, which would then be endorsed by the euro area states meeting within Euro Group. No 
amendment to the ESM Treaty would be required. This avenue has however its 
                                                 
59 See the Annex X (‘Public Debt’) of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement concluded by the EU 
with Canada; See the finalized version of the Annex X (‘Public Debt’) of the to be concluded by the EU with 
Vietnam. Note that the ‘investment chapter’ tabled by the EU in its negotiation with the US over the 
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See <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf> accessed 15 February 2015. 
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 Five Presidents’ Reports, ‘Completing the Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ (22 June 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf>accessed 15 February 
2015. 
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disadvantages. This mechanism might not be enforceable in all Euro area jurisdictions 
without more significant changes to the underlying law governing the bonds.
61
 The 
introduction of an enhanced version of the Euro CAC would only be gradual and would delay 
the moment where the entire euro area debt stock will be governed by a single set of clauses.
62
  
 
2. Developing a statutory framework for sovereign debt workout 
 
The idea of developing a statutory insolvency procedure for sovereigns has a long history. 
In 2003, the IMF advocated for the establishment of the ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism’, which was never implemented due to a lack of political support. Recent 
developments in ongoing litigation related to the 2001 Argentinean debt crisis have 
reinvigorated this debate. In September 2015, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted a set of non-binding principles applicable to sovereign debt restructurings,
63
 which 
fell short of the original ambition to develop a fully-fledged multilateral framework.
64
 Most 
notably, the EU Member States opposed the idea of a global statutory mechanism during the 
UN negotiations. In their views, the IMF should be the locus for international discussion of 
sovereign debt restructuring issues and a contractual approach based on CAC, at the 
international level at least, is to be preferred over a statutory regime.
65
  
 
At the euro area level, a similarly further-reaching option would be to adopt rules on 
sovereign debt restructuring, or even developing a complete statutory framework, which 
would replace or complement the Euro CAC.
66
 In the long run, such a sovereign debt workout 
mechanism would ideally build upon the EU institutional framework after a revision of the 
founding Treaties. A more elaborate procedure and a clarification of the hierarchy of 
claimants and the status of official creditors would enable a timely implementation of the 
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transaction and provide a greater degree of legal certainty for investors in sovereign debt. The 
European Court of Justice would act as a supervising judicial authority; rule upon creditors’ 
claims; and guarantee that a balance between state and investors’ interests is preserved.67 
 
In the medium term, significant improvements of the restructuring process could be 
achieved by expanding upon the few provisions on PSI in the ESM Treaty. In particular, L.C 
Buchheit et al. have proposed, through an amendment to the ESM Treaty, to immunize all 
assets of a Eurozone state under an ESM programme from attachment by creditors refusing to 
participate in a debt restructuring. This immunity from attachment would reduce creditors’ 
prospect of obtaining a preferential treatment through litigation in national courts or arbitral 
tribunals, thereby dissuading potential holdouts. In addition, it would minimize the risk that 
vulture funds and other recalcitrant bondholders be able to divert ESM financial assistance to 
their benefits.
68
 A revised ESM Treaty could also further identify the circumstances under 
which a restructuring would be a prerequisite to obtain financial assistance by the ESM.
69
 
 
 Modifying the ESM Treaty requires going through a lengthy process of ratification by the 
national parliaments of euro area states. There seems to be little political appetite for 
amending the ESM’s founding document only a few years after its adoption although such a 
reform would leave the euro area better equipped to handle sovereign insolvency situations 
that could impact the financial stability of the currency union as whole. 
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